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Abstract
The last two decades have witnessed a rapid development of quantum information
processing, a new paradigm which studies the power and limit of “quantum advantages”
in various information processing tasks. Problems such as when quantum advantage
exists, and if existing, how much it could be, are at a central position of these studies.
In a broad class of scenarios, there are, implicitly or explicitly, at least two parties
involved, who share a state, and the correlation in this shared state is the key factor
to the efficiency under concern. In these scenarios, the shared entanglement or discord
is usually what accounts for quantum advantage. In this paper, we examine a funda-
mental problem of this nature from the perspective of game theory, a branch of applied
mathematics studying selfish behaviors of two or more players. We exhibit a natural
zero-sum game, in which the chance for any player to win the game depends only on
the ending correlation. We show that in a certain classical equilibrium, a situation in
which no player can further increase her payoff by any local classical operation, who-
ever first uses a quantum computer has a big advantage over its classical opponent.
The equilibrium is fair to both players and, as a shared correlation, it does not contain
any discord, yet a quantum advantage still exists. This indicates that at least in game
theory, the previous notion of discord as a measure of non-classical correlation needs
to be reexamined, when there are two players with different objectives.
1 Introduction
Quantum computers have exhibited tremendous power in algorithmic, cryptographic, infor-
mation theoretic, and many other information processing tasks, compared with their classical
counterparts. Meanwhile, for a large number of problems, quantum computers are not able
to offer much advantage over classical ones. When and why quantum computers are more
powerful are always at a central position in studies on quantum computation and quantum
information processing. A particularly interesting class of scenarios is when there are, im-
plicitly or explicitly, at least two parties involved who share a state, the correlation in this
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state is the key factor. What accounts for the quantum advantage is often entanglement,
one of the most distinctive characters of quantum information. Indeed, it has been showed
that a quantum algorithm with only slight entanglement can be simulated efficiently by a
classical computer [Vid03]. In certain potential applications of quantum algorithms, it is
also shown that entangled measurement is necessary for the existence of efficient quantum
algorithms [HMR+10].
Recently people started to realize that entanglement is not always a necessary resource
needed for generating quantum correlations. It has been found that discord, another unique
character of quantum states, also plays an important role in quantum information process-
ing [OZ01]. Discord is a relaxed version of entanglement—states with positive entanglement
must also have positive discord, but there are states with positive discord but zero entan-
glement. People has discovered cases where quantum speed-up exists without entanglement
involved, and discord is considered to be responsible for the quantum advantage [DSC08].
Till today, discord is widely considered as necessary for the existence of quantum advantages.
In this paper, we reexamine this notion from the perspective of game theory [OR94].
Game theory studies the situation in which there are two or more players with possibly
different goals. There are two broad classes of games, one is strategic-form (or normal-form)
games, in which all players make their choice simultaneously; a typical example is Rock-
Paper-Scissors. The other class is extensive-form games, in which players make their moves
in turn; a typical example is chess.
The research on quantum games began about one decade ago, starting with two pio-
neering papers.1 The first one [EWL99] aimed to quantize a specific strategic-form game
called Prisoners’ Dilemma [EWL99], and it unleashed a long sequence of follow-up works
in the same model. Despite the rapid growth of literature, controversy also largely exists
[BH01, vEP02, CT06], which questioned the meaning of the claimed quantum solution, the
ad hoc assumptions in the model, and the inconsistency with standard settings of classical
strategic games. Recently a new model was proposed for quantizing general strategic-form
games [Zha12]. Compared with [EWL99], the new model corresponds to the classical games
more precisely, and has rich mathematical structures and game-theoretic questions; also see
later theoretical developments [KZ12, WZ13, JSWZ13, PKL+15].
Back to the early stage of the development of quantum game theory, the other pioneer-
ing paper was [Mey99], which demonstrated the power of using quantum strategies in an
extensive-form game. More specifically, Meyer considered the quantum version of the classi-
cal Penny Matching game. The basic setting is as follows. There are two players, and each
has two possible actions on one bit: Flip it or not. Starting with the bit being 0, Player 1
first takes an action, and then Player 2 takes an action, and finally Player 1 takes another
action, and the game is finished. If the bit is finally 0, then Player 1 wins; otherwise Player
2 wins. It is not hard to see that if Player 2 flips the bit with half probability, then no
matter what Player 1 does, each player wins the game with half probability. Now consider
1Note that there is also a class of “nonlocal games”, such as CHSH or GHZ games [BCMdW10], where
all the players have the same objective. But general game theory focuses more on situation that the players
have different objective functions, and the players are selfish, each aiming to optimize her own objective
function only.
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the following change of setting: The bit becomes a qubit; the first player uses a quantum
computer in the sense that she can perform any quantum admissible operation on the bit;
the second player uses a classical computer in the sense that she can perform either Identity
or the flip operation
[
0 1
1 0
]
. In this new setting, Player 1 can win the game with certainty!
Her winning strategy is simple: she first applies a Hadamard gate to change the state to
|+〉 = (|0〉 + |1〉)/√2, and then no matter whether Player 2 applies the flip operation or
not, the state remains the same |+〉, thus in the third step Player 1 can simply apply a
Hadamard gate again to rotate the state back to |0〉. This shows that a player using a
quantum computer can have big advantage over one using a classical computer.
Despite a very interesting phenomena it exhibits, the quantum advantage is not the most
convincing due to a fairness issue. After all, the quantum player takes two actions and
the classical player takes just one. And the order of “Player 1 → Player 2 → Player 1”
is also crucial for the quantum advantage. One remedy is to consider normal-form games,
in which the players give their strategies simultaneously, thus there is no longer the issue
of the action order. Taking the model in [Zha12], two players play a complete-information
normal-form game, with a starting state ρ in systems (A1, A2), and Ai being given to Player
i. A classical player can only measure her part of the state in the computational basis,
followed by whatever classical operation C (on the computational basis). In previous works
[EWL99, Mey99, ZWC+12] the classical player is usually assumed to be able to apply any
classical operation on computational basis (such as X-gate), followed by a measurement in
the computational basis. A classical operations there is implicitly assumed to be unitary, so
the operation in the matrix form is a permutation matrix. Here we allow classical player to
measure first and then perform any classical operation, which gives her more power since the
second-step classical operation does need to be unitary. Indeed, in Meyer’s Penny Matching
game, in the second step Player 2 could measure the state first and then randomly set it
to be |0〉 or |1〉 each with half probability. Then in the third step, Player 1’s Hadamard
gate will change the state to |+〉 or |−〉, in either case, Player 1 could win with only half
probability.
Even if we now enlarge the space of possible operations of the classical player, we will
show examples where the quantum player has advantage of winning the game. Furthermore,
the examples have the following nice properties respecting the fairness of the game:
1. If both players are classical, then both get expected payoff 0, and ρ is a correlated
equilibrium in the sense that any classical operation C by one player cannot increase
her expected payoff.
2. Suppose that one player remains classical and the other player uses a quantum com-
puter. To illustrate the power of using quantum strategies, we cut the classical player
some slack as follows. The classical player can (1) pick one subsystem, A1 or A2, of ρ,
leaving the other subsystem to the quantum player, and (2) “take side” by picking one
of the two payoff matrices, leaving the other to the quantum player.
Examples were found that even with the advantage of taking side and taking part of the
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shared state, the classical player still has a disadvantage compared to the quantum player.
Consider the canonical 2× 2 zero-sum game with the payoff matrices being
U1 =
(
1 −1
−1 1
)
and U2 =
(−1 1
1 −1
)
. (1)
Quantum game with entanglement Each player i owns a 2-dimensional Hilbert space,
and they share the quantum state
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|+ 0〉+ | − 1〉) = 1√
2
(|0+〉+ |1−〉), (2)
where |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉), and |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). It is not difficult to verify that if both
players measure their parts in the computational basis, then each gets payoff 1 and −1 with
equal probability, resulting an average payoff of zero for both players. This is a correlated
equilibrium for classical operations.
Now suppose that Player 1 employs a quantum computer. Since the state is symmetric,
it does not matter which part Player 2, the classical player, chooses. Let us assume that
Player 2 chooses part 2, and the payoff matrix U2. Then Player 1 can apply the Hadamard
transformation on her qubit, followed by the measurement in computational basis. The state
immediately before the measurement is |ψ′〉 = (|00〉+ |11〉)/√2. Therefore the measurement
in the computational basis gives Player 1 and Player 2 payoff 1 and −1, respectively, with
certainty. In other words, Player 1 wins with certainty, whereas she could only win with half
probability when using a classical computer.
In this example where the quantum player has an advantage, the state shared by players is
highly entangled, which motivates the following natural question: Is entanglement necessary
for quantum advantage in the game? It turns out that the answer is no. Consider the
example below.
Quantum game with discord The payoff matrices are the same as before, but the
quantum state shared by players is the following.
ρ =
1
4
(|+〉〈+| ⊗ |0〉〈0|+ |0〉〈0| ⊗ |+〉〈+|+ |−〉〈−| ⊗ |1〉〈1|+ |1〉〈1| ⊗ |−〉〈−|). (3)
This state is separable and thus does not have any entanglement. It can be checked that if
the players measure this state in computational basis, the probability of getting each of the
four possible outcomes is 1/4. Thus the overall payoff of each player is zero, and it can be
verified that it is a classical correlated equilibrium.
In the quantum setting, again without loss of generality assume that the classical com-
puter picks the second part of ρ and the second payoff matrix. The quantum player can
again perform a Hadamard operation on her system, resulting in a new state
ρ′ =
1
4
(|0〉〈0| ⊗ |0〉〈0|+ |+〉〈+| ⊗ |+〉〈+|+ |1〉〈1| ⊗ |1〉〈1|+ |−〉〈−| ⊗ |−〉〈−|). (4)
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Measuring the new state, the quantum player gets state |00〉, |01〉, |10〉, |11〉 with probability
3/8, 1/8, 1/8, 3/8 respectively. As a result, her winning probability increases from 1/2 to
3/4; in other words, she gets an expected payoff of 1/2.
Note that the quantum state in Eq.(4) is separable, and there is no any entanglement,
but the quantum player still gets a quantum advantage. Thus, entanglement is not necessary
for quantum advantage to exist in this game. Note that, however, the state in Eq.(4) has a
positive discord. As we have mentioned, it was known that in some scenarios, it is discord,
rather than entanglement, that produces non-classical correlations. So the above example
confirms this traditional notion in the new game-theoretic setting.
These two examples were also experimentally verified recently [ZWC+12]. The present
paper makes further studies on the foregoing notion by asking the following fundamental
question.
Is discord necessary for quantum advantage to exist in games where players share
a symmetric state?
It is tempting to conjecture that the answer is Yes. In the rest of the paper, we will show
that, first, discord is indeed necessary for any quantum advantage to exist in a 2-player
games where each player has n = 2 strategies. We will then show that when n ≥ 3, however,
there are games where the quantum player has a positive advantage even when the shared
symmetric state has zero discord.
2 Preliminaries
Suppose that in a classical game there are k players, labeled by {1, 2, . . . , k}. Each player i
has a set Si of strategies. To play the game, each player i selects a strategy si from Si. We use
s = (s1, . . . , sk) to denote the joint strategy selected by the players and S = S1× . . .× Sk to
denote the set of all possible joint strategies. Each player i has a utility function ui : S → R,
specifying the payoff or utility ui(s) of Player i on the joint strategy s. For simplicity of
notation, we use subscript −i to denote the set [k]−{i}, so s−i is (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sk),
and similarly for S−i, p−i, etc. In this paper, we will mainly consider 2-player games.
Nash equilibrium is a fundamental solution concept in game theory. Roughly, it says
that in a joint strategy, no player can gain more by changing her strategy, provided that all
other players keep their current strategies unchanged. The precise definition is as follows.
Definition 1 A pure Nash equilibrium is a joint strategy s = (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ S satisfying
that
ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(s′i, s−i) (5)
for all i ∈ [k] and all s′i ∈ Si.
Pure Nash equilibria can be generalized by allowing each player to independently select her
strategy according to some probability distribution, leading to the following concept of mixed
Nash equilibrium.
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Definition 2 A (mixed) Nash equilibrium (NE) is a product probability distribution p =
p1 × . . .× pk, where each pi is a probability distributions over Si, satisfying that∑
s
−i
p−i(s−i)ui(si, s−i) ≥
∑
s
−i
p−i(s−i)ui(s′i, s−i), (6)
for all i ∈ [k], and all si, s′i ∈ Si with pi(si) > 0.
A fundamental fact proved by Nash [Nas51] is that every game with a finite number of
players and a finite set of strategies for each player has at least one mixed Nash equilibrium.
There are various further extensions of mixed Nash equilibria. Aumann [Aum74] in-
troduced a relaxation called correlated equilibrium. This notion assumes an external party,
called Referee, to draw a joint strategy s = (s1, ..., sk) from some probability distribution
p over S, possibly correlated in an arbitrary way, and to suggest si to Player i. Note that
Player i only sees si, thus the rest strategy s−i is a random variable over S−i distributed
according to the conditional distribution p|si, the distribution p conditioned on the i-th part
being si. Now p is a correlated equilibrium if any Player i, upon receiving a suggested strat-
egy si, has no incentive to change her strategy to a different s
′
i ∈ Si, assuming that all other
players stick to their received suggestion s−i.
Definition 3 A correlated equilibrium (CE) is a probability distribution p over S satisfying
that ∑
s
−i
p(si, s−i)ui(si, s−i) ≥
∑
s
−i
p(si, s−i)ui(s′i, s−i), (7)
for all i ∈ [k], and all si, s′i ∈ Si.
The above statement can also be restated as
Es
−i←µ|si[ui(si, s−i)] ≥ Es−i←µ|si[ui(s′i, s−i)]. (8)
where µ|si is the distribution µ conditioned on the i-th component being si. Notice that a
classical correlated equilibrium p is a classical Nash equilibrium if p is a product distribution.
Correlated equilibria captures natural games such as the Traffic Light and the Battle of
the Sexes ([VNRET97], Chapter 1). The set of CE also has good mathematical properties
such as being convex (with Nash equilibria being some of the vertices of the polytope). Al-
gorithmically, it is computationally benign for finding the best CE, measured by any linear
function of payoffs, simply by solving a linear program (of polynomial size for games of con-
stant players). A natural learning dynamics also leads to an approximate CE ([VNRET97],
Chapter 4) which we will define next, and all CE in a graphical game with n players and
with log(n) degree can be found in polynomial time ([VNRET97], Chapter 7).
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3 Quantum game without discord
In this section, we will address the question proposed at the end of the first section. Suppose
that a game has two players and both of them have n strategies. In other words, each player
holds an n-dimensional quantum system. Recall that we also require the shared quantum
state ρ ∈ H⊗H be symmetric, so that swapping the two systems does not change the state.
It is not hard to derive from the general criteria of zero-discord state [DVB10] that these
quantum states ρ have the form of
ρ =
n−1∑
i,j=0
p(i, j)|ψi〉〈ψi| ⊗ |ψj〉〈ψj|, (9)
where {|ψi〉} is a set of orthogonal basis of the n-dimensional Hilbert space H , and P =
[p(i, j)]ij ∈ Rn×n+ is a symmetric matrix with nonnegative entries satisfying that
∑
ij p(i, j) =
1. (In general, we use the upper case letter P to denote the matrix and the lower case letter
p to denote the corresponding two-variate distribution p(i, j).) We sometimes also write the
state as
ρ =
∑
i
p1(i)|ψi〉〈ψi| ⊗ σi (10)
where p1(i) =
∑
j p(i, j) is the marginal distribution on the first system, and σi =
∑
j
p(i,j)
p1(i)
|ψj〉〈ψj |
(if p1(i) = 0 then let σi = |0〉〈0|).
Consider the following game as a natural extension of the Penny Matching game in
Section 1. The payoff matrices are
U1 = nI − J and U2 = −U1, (11)
where J is the all-one matrix. Intuitively, whoever takes the first matrix bets that the two
n-sided dice give the same side, and the other player bets that the two dice give different
sides. We first show that there is a unique correlated equilibrium in the game.
Lemma 1 The game given by Eq.(11) has only one classical correlated equilibrium Q =
J/n2.
Proof: According to the definition of correlated equilibrium, if a distribution q on [n]× [n]
is a classical correlated equilibrium, then the following relationships hold:∑
j
q(i, j)U1(i, j) ≥
∑
j
q(i, j)U1(i
′, j), ∀i, i′ ∈ {0, 1, ..., n− 1}, (12)
and ∑
i
q(i, j)U2(i, j) ≥
∑
i
q(i, j)U2(i, j
′), ∀j, j′ ∈ {0, 1, ..., n− 1}. (13)
Plugging the definition of U1 and U2 into the above inequalities, one can verify that Q = J/n
2
is the only solution.
7
Recall that ρ =
∑
i p1(i)|ψi〉〈ψi| ⊗ σi. Since ρ is symmetric, it does not matter which
part the classical player, Player 2, chooses to hold. For the convenience of discussions, let us
assume that the classical player takes the second part. We use supp(p) to denote the support
of a distribution p, i.e. the set of elements with non-zero probability. The next lemma gives
a sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of quantum advantage.
Lemma 2 Suppose that measuring the state ρ gives a classical correlated equilibrium for the
game given in Eq.(11). Then Player 1 (who is quantum) does not have any advantage if and
only if
〈i|σj |i〉 = 1/n, ∀i ∈ {0, 1, ..., n− 1} and j ∈ supp(p1). (14)
Proof: “Only if”: Assume that Player 1 first measures her part in the orthonormal basis
{|ψi〉}. Note that this does not affect the state. If outcome j occurs, then Player 1 knows
that the state of Player 2 is σj . We consider which utility matrix in Eq.(11) Player 1 has.
In the first case, Player 1 takes the utility matrix U1. It is not hard to see that her optimal
strategy is to replace her part |ψj〉 by |i〉, where i is a maximizer of maxi〈i|σj|i〉. Thus Player
1 has a strict positive advantage if and only if there is some i and j, where j ∈ supp(p1),
with 〈i|σj|i〉 > 1/n, which is equivalent to saying that there is some i and j ∈ supp(p1) with
〈i|σj |i〉 6= 1/n.
Similarly, if Player 1 takes the utility matrix U2, then her optimal strategy is to replace
|ψj〉 with |i〉, where i is a minimizer of mini〈i|σj |i〉. Thus Player 1 has a strict positive
advantage if and only if there is some i and j with 〈i|σj|i〉 < 1/n, which is again equivalent
to saying that there is some i and j with 〈i|σj |i〉 6= 1/n.
“If”: Player 2 measures her part in the computational basis, yielding the state
1
n
∑
i,j
p1(j)|ψj〉〈ψj| ⊗ |i〉〈i|.
Now whatever quantum operation Player 1 applies, the probability of observing the same
bits (i.e. the state after the measurement is |ii〉 for some i) is 1/n, with the expected payoff
of 0 for both players.
Though the above lemma gives a sufficient and necessary condition, it is still not always
clear whether quantum advantage could exist for any symmetric state ρ with zero discord.
Next we will further the study by considering a related matrix M ∈ Rn×n+ , whose (i, j)-th
entry is defined to be
M(i, j) = |〈i|ψj〉|2. (15)
It turns out that the rank of M is an important criteria to our question. In the rest of
this section, we will consider two cases, depending on whether M is full rank or not.
3.1 Case 1: M is full-rank
We will first show that ifM is full-rank, then the quantum player cannot have any advantage.
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Theorem 3 Suppose that the two players of the game Eq.(11) share a symmetric state ρ,
measuring which gives a classical correlated equilibrium. Then Player 1 (who is quantum)
does not have any advantage if M in Eq.(15) is full-rank.
Proof: By Lemma 1, for any 0 ≤ k, j ≤ n− 1 we have
n−1∑
i=0
p1(i)|〈k|ψi〉|2 · 〈j|σi|j〉 = 1
n2
Summing over j, we obtain another equality
n−1∑
i=0
p1(i)|〈k|ψi〉|2 = 1
n
.
Combining these two equalities, we have
n−1∑
i=0
|〈k|ψi〉|2 · p1(i)
(
〈j|σi|j〉 − 1
n
)
= 0.
Define a matrix A = [a(i, j)]ij ∈ Rn×n by a(i, j) = p1(i)
(〈j|σi|j〉 − 1n). Then the above
equality is just
∑
iM(k, i)a(i, j) = 0 for all k, j. In other words, we have
M · A = 0. (16)
Since the matrix M is assumed to be full-rank, we have A = M−10 = 0. The conclusion
thus follows by Lemma 2.
Two corollaries are in order. First, note thatM is full-rank for a generic orthogonal basis
{|ψi〉}, it is generically true that no discord implies no quantum advantage.
Corollary 4 If a set of orthonormal basis {|ψi〉} is picked uniformly at random, then with
probability 1, the quantum player does not have any advantage.
The second corollary considers the case of n = 2, which is settled by the above theorem
completely. Indeed, when n = 2, the rank of M is either 1 or 2. The rank-2 case is handled
by the above theorem. If the rank is 1, it is not hard to see that the only possible M is
M =
[
1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2
]
. In this case, for any i and any k it holds that
〈k|σi|k〉 = 〈k|
(∑
j
p(j|i)|ψj〉〈ψj|
)
|k〉 =
∑
j
p(j|i)|〈k|ψj〉|2 = 1
2
∑
j
p(j|i) = 1
2
.
Applying Lemma 2, we thus get the following corollary.
Corollary 5 There is no quantum advantage for the game defined in Eq.(1) on any sym-
metric state ρ with zero discord.
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3.2 Case 2: M is not full rank
Somewhat surprisingly, the quantum player can have an advantage when M is not full-rank.
In this section we exhibit a counterexample for n = 3. In this case, recall that the payoff
matrices are
U1 =

 2 −1 −1−1 2 −1
−1 −1 2

 and U2 =

−2 1 11 −2 1
1 1 −2

 . (17)
We consider the following quantum state,
ρ =
2∑
i,j=0
p(i, j)|ψi〉〈ψi| ⊗ |ψj〉〈ψj|, (18)
where
|ψ0〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) , |ψ1〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉) , |ψ2〉 = |2〉. (19)
It is not hard to calculate M :
M =

1/2 1/2 01/2 1/2 0
0 0 1

 . (20)
which has rank 2. Define
P =

4/9 0 00 0 2/9
0 2/9 1/9

 . (21)
It can be easily verified that if the two players measure the state in computational basis,
the probability distribution yielded is uniform, which is a classical Nash equilibrium.
Now suppose that Player 1 uses a quantum computer. One can verify that the condition in
Lemma 2 does not hold. For a concrete illustration, let us consider the protocol in Lemma 2
again. Player 1 first measures in the basis {|+〉, |−〉, |2〉}. With probability 4/9, she observes
|+〉, then changes it to |0〉. Player 2’s state is also |+〉 in this case, thus a measurement in the
computational basis gives the |00〉 and |01〉 each with half probability. Thus Player 1’s payoff
in this case is 2 · 1
2
− 1 · 1
2
= 1
2
. The second case is that Player 1 observes |−〉, which happens
with probability 2/9, and Player 2’s state is |2〉 for sure. Player 1 changes her part to |2〉, and
gets payoff 2. The third case is that Player 1 observes |2〉, which happens with probability
1/3, leaving Player 2 σ3 = (2/3)|1〉〈1|+ (1/3)|2〉〈2|. Player 1 then changes her qubit to |1〉,
collides with Player 2’s outcome with probability 1/3, thus Player 1’s payoff is 2 · 1
3
−1 · 2
3
= 0.
On average, the quantum player has a payoff of (4/9)(1/2) + (2/9) · 2 + (1/3) · 0 = 2/3.
It should be pointed out that the matrix P achieving the quantum advantage of 2/3 is
not unique. For example, the following matrix also works with the same effect:
P =

2/9 2/9 00 0 2/9
1/9 1/9 1/9

 . (22)
10
3.3 Optimization
In this subsection, we show that the 3-dimensional example in the above subsection is actually
optimal for M defined in Eq.(20). Actually the theorem below shows more. Note that if the
rank of M is 1, it is easy to prove that M must be the uniform matrix, and the quantum
advantage must be zero, thus in the following we suppose the rank of M to be 2.
Theorem 6 Suppose that measuring the state ρ gives a classical correlated equilibrium. Sup-
pose the columns of M are M0,M1 and M2. Without loss of generality, suppose M0 =
xM1 + (1− x)M2, where 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. Then the quantum advantage
QA ≤ 1
3
+
1
3xb
, (23)
where xb = max{x, 1− x}.
Proof: By Lemma 1, for any 0 ≤ k, l ≤ 2 we have
2∑
i,j=0
p(i, j)|〈k|ψi〉|2 · |〈l|ψj〉|2 = 1
9
. (24)
This turns out to be equivalent to
M · P ·MT = J
9
. (25)
Noting that M · (J/9) ·MT = J/9, we know that P can be expressed as
P =
J
9
+ P¯ , (26)
where M · P¯ ·MT = 0. By straightforward calculation, one can show that Eq.(26) indicates
M · P¯ = 0. (27)
Considering the form of M , P¯ can now be expressed as
P¯ =

 k0 k1 k2−k0x −k1x −k2x
−k0(1− x) −k1(1− x) −k2(1− x)

 , (28)
where k0, k1 and k2 are real numbers.
According to the discussion above, we know that the maximal quantum advantage is
QA =
2∑
i=0
p1(i)[2 · 〈li|σi|li〉 − 1 · (1− 〈li|σi|li〉)], (29)
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where li = maxl〈l|σi|l〉. Then it holds that
QA = 3
2∑
i=0
p1(i) · 〈li|σi|li〉 − 1
= 3
2∑
i,j=0
p(i, j)|〈li|ψj〉|2 − 1
= 3
2∑
i,j=0
(
1
9
+ p¯(i, j)
)
|〈li|ψj〉|2 − 1
= 3
2∑
i=0
(
2∑
j=0
p¯(i, j)|〈li|ψj〉|2
)
,
where p¯(i, j) is the element of P¯ . At the same time, it can be obtained that li = maxl
∑
j p¯(i, j)|〈l|ψj〉|2.
Besides, recall that the rank of M is 2, then there must be one row of M , say M2, has the
form of aM0 + (1 − a)M1, where M0 and M1 are the other two rows of M , and 0 ≤ a ≤ 1.
Then it can be known that every li must be 0 or 1. Based on the form of P¯ , we have that
l0 6= l1 = l2. Without loss of generality, we suppose l0 = 0, and l1 = l2 = 1. Then
QA = 3
2∑
j=0
p¯(0, j)|〈0|ψj〉|2 + 3
2∑
j=0
(p¯(1, j) + p¯(2, j))|〈1|ψj〉|2
= 3
2∑
j=0
p¯(0, j)|〈0|ψj〉|2 − 3
2∑
j=0
p¯(0, j)|〈1|ψj〉|2.
Note that P¯ + J/9 is a matrix with nonnegative elements. Thus, for any 0 ≤ i ≤ 2, if ki ≥ 0
we have
− kix ≥ −1
9
and − ki(1− x) ≥ −1
9
, (30)
and if ki < 0, we have −ki ≤ 19 . And Eq.(30) indicates that if 0 < x < 1,
ki ≤ 1
9x
and ki ≤ 1
9(1− x) , (31)
which is equivalent to
ki ≤ 1
9xb
. (32)
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Actually, Eq.(32) also holds when x = 0 or x = 1. Therefore, we obtain that
QA = 3
2∑
j=0
p¯(0, j)|〈0|ψj〉|2 − 3
2∑
j=0
p¯(0, j)|〈1|ψj〉|2
= 3
2∑
j=0
kj|〈0|ψj〉|2 − 3
2∑
j=0
kj|〈1|ψj〉|2
≤ 3 · 1
9xb
+ 3 · 1
9
=
1
3
+
1
3xb
,
where the relationship
∑
j |〈0|ψj〉|2 =
∑
j |〈1|ψj〉|2 = 1 is utilized.
Go back to the example in the above subsection. Note that for M in Eq.(20) we have
M0 = 1 ·M1 + 0 ·M2(thus in order to utilize Theorem.6, we need to adjust the order of the
columns). Thus we can choose x = 0, and then xb = 1. As a result, the discussion above
shows that QA ≤ 2/3, which means the choice of P in Eq.(21) is optimal for M in Eq.(20).
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that in certain fair equilibria of some natural games, the player
with a quantum computer can be more powerful than the classical opponent, even if the equi-
libria have zero entanglement or discord. This indicates that at least in games, the standard
understanding that nonzero discord is necessary to produce non-classical correlations needs
to be adjusted. Our work provides new visions for further studies on quantum information,
especially when at least two parties are involved with different objectives.
From the mathematical perspective, some questions remain open. Two of them are listed
as below: (1) What is the maximum gain in a zero-sum [−1, 1]-normalized game2 on a state
in symmetric subspace without entanglement? (2) What is the maximum gain in a zero-sum
[−1, 1]-normalized game on a state in symmetric subspace without discord?
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